Reasons for Thinking that
Life is Non-Laplacean
INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION-PROCESSING AND THE LAWS OF NATURE
What would a satisfactory mechanistic theory which bridges the gap between the behaviour of a human being or animal and what is going on in the brain be like? If details are wanted then there are about as many answers to this question as there are theorists concerned with it. But at an abstract enough level the answer is straightforward. Such a theory would take the following form.
(1) It would include a description of what objects and features of the environment, and of what kinds of bodily movements, are to be represented, i.e. symbolised, by processes in the brain. On the perceptual side, there are in fact neurones in the cerebral cortex that 'respond' mainly to the contours or the corners of things seen, others that respond most readily to the distinctive speech sounds (phonemes) of spoken language, others that are especially involved in the recognition of faces and voices, and so forth.
1 On the corresponding 'motor' side less is known, but there are neurones that are especially involved with the articulation of the distinctive movements of the tongue, larynx and lips in speech, others that play a corresponding role in writing, 2 and doubtless the same is true of the motor components of all the bodily movements of cats, dogs and the other mammals. But the thing about a fully mechanistic account of the perceptual and motor-side features represented in the brain is that their description would be complete, precise and unambiguous.
(2) The remaining part of a mechanistic theory of intelligence would state, completely, precisely and unambiguously, how the perceptual representations are to be linked to the motor representations. For any given combination of perceptual representations the theory would specify what, if any, motor representation would result. The theory would specify what operations are to be performed on the perceptual representations to achieve this. The simplest such scheme which has been proposed is that of stimulus-response theories in experimental psychology. The only operations envisaged here are linking operations between particular stimuli (what I have called perceptual representations) and particular responses (what I have called motor representations); the focus of such theories is on learning, on how the supposed linkages can be strengthened or weakened. But there is no need for the processing operations supposedly mediating between the perceptual and motor sides to be at all simple. Indeed, the only constraints on their complexity have to do with what is psychologically plausible and with the time and brain space needed to complete the operations. Computer programs in artificial intelligence are descriptions which usually prescribe very complex mediating operations between the computer's 'input' and its 'output'; for there is no need for the complexity of these operations to be limited to the complexity of the operations thought to mediate the natural intelligence of human beings. But the presumption in cognitive psychology too is that complex operations, a kind of reasoning, usually intervene between our perceptual and our motor representations even when we are not aware of it.
That animal and human intelligence could be explained by a theory of the above type, where much of its explanatory power would come from the intervening operations which are posited, was put forward as a pioneering hypothesis by Kenneth Craik in his book The Nature of Explanation (1943) .
3 My point here is different. It is simply this: if the brain is nothing other than a physiological mechanism, something which is to all intents and purposes demon-computable, then the brain would work entirely along the lines just described. In short, if the brain is a mechanism then it is an information-processor. This, I take it, is evident from what has been said.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the brain is an information-processing device. Then, if the perceptual features represented in it are relevant, if the processing of this represented information is appropriate, and the outcome 'translated' without mishap into muscular contractions, then the resulting bodily movements would, in the prevailing circumstances, constitute intelligent behaviour. Of course, what would constitute 'relevant'
